To examine a scenario in which 14th-century civilization adopts a universal ethical ban on killing and exploiting animals, an interdisciplinary approach is needed: biophysics, agroecology, nutrition science, epidemiology and energy analysis.
In this model the ban is absolute: animals disappear from the economy not only as a source of dietary protein but also as draft power, as suppliers of raw materials for light industry (wool, leather, silk) and for lubricants and lighting (whale oil, tallow), as model organisms for medicine and as components of pharmaceuticals.
The 14th century is chosen because of the crisis of Eurasia’s classic medieval agrarian order, which coincided with the onset of the Little Ice Age and demographic shocks[1]. The analysis of what abandoning animal husbandry would mean weighs thermodynamic gains against the technological barriers humanity would have hit on its way to modernity.
An early version of this analysis was too optimistic. So each section here is examined in two layers:
The optimistic scenario — the model’s direct thermodynamic and ecological gains, which are genuinely real in theory (less cropland, less methane, no exposure to a number of zoonoses).
The critical view of modern science — what current research says about the real cost of giving up animal protein and animal products without industrial means of compensation (synthetic B₁₂, fortification, agrochemistry). Modern nutrition science, immunology and development economics show unambiguously that chronic deficiency of complete protein and micronutrients is not an abstract theory but a measurable cause of stunting, cognitive losses and higher mortality in populations without access to animal-source foods or their industrial substitutes[15], [16].
Traditional Eurasian agriculture rested on an inseparable symbiosis of crop farming and livestock: animals concentrated biomass and, through manure, were the main source of organic nitrogen and phosphorus[2]. Abandoning livestock confronts agronomy with a fundamental problem: how to maintain soil fertility before industrial nitrogen fixation exists.
+ Trophic optimization: By the laws of ecological thermodynamics, converting plant calories into animal calories loses 85–90% of the primary energy. Without the intermediate consumer, the whole harvest of grains and legumes goes directly to feeding people, and the need for farmland falls: by modern estimates, a fully plant-based diet requires roughly three-quarters less agricultural land[3].
+ Preventing large-scale deforestation: In real history vast areas of forest in Europe and North and South America were cleared for pasture and feed crops. In the biocentric model forests survive, soils suffer less from water and wind erosion, and continental hydrology is more stable[4].
− The nitrogen crisis and diverting cropland to green manure: As Vaclav Smil showed in Enriching the Earth, until ammonia synthesis by the Haber–Bosch process in 1909, yields were tightly limited by available reactive nitrogen[2]. Without manure, the only source of nitrogen is biological fixation by the root-nodule bacteria of legumes (clover, lupine, vetch, alfalfa)[2]. To keep soils in balance, farmers would have to regularly set aside a large share of sown area for legumes and green manure[2]. That would eat up a noticeable part of the gain from having no livestock.
− Parasitic soil contamination: If the lack of fertilizer were offset by scaling up the East Asian practice of fertilizing with human waste (“night soil”), described by Franklin King in Farmers of Forty Centuries[6], then without reliable composting it would contaminate soils and groundwater with helminth eggs and intestinal pathogens.
A meta-analysis of 66 studies (Seufert et al., Nature, 2012) found that even modern organic farming — which, unlike the scenario, has manure — yields on average about a quarter less than conventional farming, and for cereals the gap is explained mostly by nitrogen shortage[7]. With medieval farming techniques and no scientific understanding of legume symbiosis and crop rotation, nitrogen deficiency would be not a temporary inconvenience but a chronic constraint lowering the caloric yield of harvests for centuries — a permanent background of undernourishment rather than a one-off crisis[2], [7].
The heaviest consequence of giving up animal exploitation is the loss of the main source of mechanical energy in the pre-industrial era[8].
− Falling productivity and agrarian bondage: According to Vaclav Smil’s calculations (Energy and Civilization: A History), until the 19th century the muscle power of animals and people provided more than 90% of all mechanical work in the economy[8]. A horse delivers a sustained working power of 500–750 W and an ox about 500 W, while the limit of human physiology in continuous work is only 70–100 W[8]. Without draft animals, heavy clay soils cannot be turned with a moldboard plow[9]. Farming everywhere is reduced to hand digging and hoe work. To feed itself, 90–95% of the population would have to stay in agriculture, sharply slowing urbanization and the development of crafts and fundamental science[8].
− A slower early mining industry: Before the steam engines of Savery and Newcomen, water was pumped out of deep mines and ore was hoisted with horse-driven whims. Without horse power, the growth of coal and metal mining in the 14th–17th centuries is delayed.
− A slower industrial transition: The cumulative deficit of mechanical energy pushes a full industrial revolution back by 150–200 years, shifting the technological level of the turn of the 19th–20th centuries into the 21st–22nd.
The 70–100 W estimate for a human assumes a worker who is adequately fed. A systematic review by Haas and Brownlie (2001) shows that iron-deficiency anemia causally reduces work capacity — not only strength but endurance falls, because the blood carries oxygen less well[10]. In other words, the real power output of a medieval peasant who is undernourished and gets no animal protein would be lower than even this modest estimate. It is a vicious circle: less energy in the diet → less mechanical work → a smaller harvest → even less energy.
+ Faster canal building: Since heavy loads cannot be hauled by draft animals, there is a strong incentive to build inland waterways, locked canals and rail systems long before their historical counterparts. Water transport, with far lower resistance, becomes the backbone of continental trade.
+ Early development of wind and water power: Engineering effort concentrates on improving water wheels, windmills and mechanical transmissions to replace manual labor in mills, sawmills and forges[8].
One of the most visible advantages of the biocentric scenario is the absence of livestock as a source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. This would change the planet’s climate trajectory.
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), livestock supply chains account for about 14.5% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (18% in the 2006 report)[11]. Ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats) emit methane through enteric fermentation — the bacterial breakdown of cellulose in the stomach[11]. Over a 100-year horizon, one kilogram of methane is equivalent to 28–34 kilograms of carbon dioxide.
In a biocentric world these emissions simply do not exist. Anthropogenic methane emissions would be noticeably lower: today livestock manure and enteric fermentation account for about 32% of all anthropogenic methane emissions[12].
The historical deforestation of Europe and the Americas was driven largely by the expansion of pasture. In 2017–2022, for example, about 78% of direct forest clearing in the Amazon went to pasture[5], and beef remains the largest driver of deforestation worldwide[4]. Forest ecosystems are powerful carbon sinks: a hectare of intact tropical forest stores hundreds of tons of carbon in biomass and soil.
Preserving the forests of Eurasia, the Americas and Africa means:
These benefits, however, would be partly offset by population growth, since people themselves produce carbon dioxide — through heating homes, cooking and so on.
The climate gain rests on the assumption that humanity does not compensate for low yields (Section 2) by expanding cropland. But historically that is exactly what happened: a shortage of calories per hectare pushes toward extensive farming — plowing new land instead of intensifying[7]. The IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (2019) shows that with low crop productivity, compensatory forest clearing for new cropland can partly or completely cancel the gain from having no livestock methane. So the climate effect of the scenario depends not on abandoning animals as such but on agrochemical knowledge that did not exist in the 14th century[13].
Giving up all animal food with a medieval level of knowledge about physiology creates a set of nutritional risks that would determine the health of entire populations.
| Health benefits | Drawbacks and deficiencies |
|---|---|
| + Minimal saturated fat Less early atherosclerosis, a sharp drop in heart attacks |
− Cobalamin (B₁₂) deficiency Pernicious anemia, spinal cord damage |
| + Less gout Especially among elites, who historically suffered from it most |
− Poor iron absorption Blocked by phytates, iron-deficiency anemia |
| + Plenty of fiber Lower risk of colon cancer |
− Zinc, calcium and vitamin D deficiency Rickets, osteomalacia in pregnant women and children |
Plants do not synthesize vitamin B₁₂; in the biosphere it is produced only by bacteria and archaea. B₁₂ deficiency disrupts DNA synthesis in blood-forming tissue (megaloblastic anemia) and destroys the myelin sheath of nerve fibers in the spinal cord and brain[14]. Until crystalline cobalamin was isolated in 1948 and microbial production established in the 1950s, humanity would have suffered a chronic hidden deficiency of this nutrient[14]. It would be partly offset only by untreated water, soil bacteria on poorly washed vegetables and specific fermentation of legumes (tempeh, natto, miso).
Non-heme iron from legumes and grains is absorbed several times less efficiently than heme iron, and phytic acid binds zinc, magnesium and calcium into insoluble compounds. In lean years this would lead to outbreaks of anemia, rickets and osteomalacia, especially among pregnant women and children.
This is probably the most serious weakness of the whole scenario. Modern vegan diets in developed countries are safe only thanks to industrial supplements — synthetic B₁₂, often iron and zinc — and a year-round variety of imported foods[14]. None of this existed in the 14th century.
Data from The Lancet series on maternal and child nutrition and controlled studies in developing countries, covering modern populations with chronic deficiency of animal protein (above all children in regions with limited access to meat and dairy), show a consistent link between protein-energy malnutrition and stunting, delayed cognitive development and higher child mortality from infections due to weakened immunity[15], [16]. This is not a hypothesis — it is documented 20th- and 21st-century epidemiology.
Complete protein (all 9 essential amino acids in the right proportion) on a medieval plant diet requires combining several crops at once (grains + legumes) in sufficient quantity every day — and sufficient quantity was exactly the main problem of pre-industrial farming (see Section 2). Layering an agronomic calorie deficit on top of biochemically incomplete protein means the realistic scenario is not a “healthy plant-based menu” but chronic undernourishment at the level of mid-20th-century developing countries, stretched over eight centuries.
One often underestimated problem of the biocentric scenario is the extreme vulnerability of medieval farming to climate shocks. Abandoning livestock would make this fragility worse.
In real history livestock was a critical reserve of calories and protein in lean years[17]. If winter rye froze in abnormal cold, peasants could survive on dairy, meat and animal fat. Animals that are undemanding feeders (eating grass, hay, crop residues) turned barely usable plant biomass into valuable dietary protein.
In a biocentric world this safety cushion disappears. The famines of the 14th–17th centuries — from the Great Famine of 1315–1322 to the crises of the Little Ice Age — already claimed millions of lives[1], [17]. Without livestock they would have been deadlier still, especially in regions at the climatic margin of farming (Scandinavia, northern Russia, the Alpine regions).
The world’s population in the 14th–17th centuries would most likely have been noticeably smaller than it actually was — the exact size cannot be estimated without dedicated modeling. That might have prevented some ecological overload, but it would also have meant slower progress in science, art and technology: innovation needs a critical mass of people and the exchange of knowledge.
Studies of famine (notably Amartya Sen’s classic analysis) show that mortality depends not only on the total amount of food but also on whether families have assets that can be exchanged for food. Livestock was historically such an “edible bank reserve” — it could be turned into calories at any moment of a crisis, unlike grain, which rots in prolonged damp or is lost to rodents[18]. Removing this buffer without a replacement (refrigeration, preserving, state grain reserves all came much later) means not just a smaller population but systematically sharper swings in mortality from year to year — clearly visible in modern famine research on regions with monoculture cropping and no livestock reserve[18].
The structure of human infectious disease is inseparably tied to people and domestic animals living together[19].
+ Destroying the reservoirs of “crowd diseases”: As historian William McNeill (Plagues and Peoples) and Jared Diamond (Guns, Germs, and Steel) showed, the key infectious diseases of civilization arose from pathogens of herd animals[19], [21]:
Isolating humans from farm animals prevents these diseases from arising or breaks their global pandemic chains, saving an enormous number of children’s lives over the centuries[19].
− No Jenner-style vaccination: In 1796 Edward Jenner made a scientific breakthrough using cross-immunity: inoculation with cowpox, harmless to humans, reliably protected against deadly smallpox[22]. In a biocentric world without dairy farming there is simply no cowpox. Humanity is left without a universal safe smallpox vaccine until scientific virology and cell-line culture emerge in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
− Outbreaks of intestinal infections: Farming’s dependence on the organic waste of human settlements triggers regular epidemics of cholera, amoebiasis and typhoid in river and lakeside urban centers.
The section above speaks of zoonoses disappearing, but modern immunology adds an important caveat: resistance to the remaining infections (plague, typhus, intestinal pathogens) itself depends on nutrition. Protein-energy malnutrition is a documented cause of immunodeficiency: antibody production falls, the barrier function of mucous membranes weakens, and infections last longer and run more severely[15]. A population chronically short of complete protein (Section 5) would face bubonic plague and intestinal infections with weakened immunity. So part of the gain from “fewer diseases” is eaten up by the remaining diseases running harder and killing more often.
Beyond material factors, abandoning animal husbandry would profoundly change humanity’s intellectual and artistic culture — an area often skipped in economic and technical analysis.
Throughout history, hunting and horse riding were the main ways for the aristocracy to display status and military strength[23]. Hunting required land, horses, dogs and considerable resources, so it was available only to elites. In a biocentric world hunting is banned outright. This means:
The most radical difference would be that European scholasticism and philosophy would develop on a biocentric rather than an anthropocentric foundation. If in the 14th century the ban on killing animals had been enshrined in religious and legal systems (as in the Indian traditions of ahimsa — Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism)[24], then:
The history of science shows that a society’s values shape its scientific priorities. A biocentric world would mean:
The very mechanism for introducing a “universal ethical ban” in the 14th century is left outside the scenario. Historical examples of large-scale dietary and behavioral prohibitions (ascetic monastic orders, Buddhist and Jain communities, medieval sumptuary laws) show that such norms either remained the lot of a minority or required harsh institutional coercion — church or state control with punishments for violations. Historical sociology knows no case of an entire civilization voluntarily giving up a millennia-old dietary and economic practice without violence or prolonged ideological pressure. So the “peaceful” transition the scenario assumes is itself an optimistic assumption.
A change in the material base fundamentally changes the direction of institutional development in European and world society. Without livestock as a source of clothing (wool, leather), lubricants (tallow) and fertilizer, entire industries disappear and new ones emerge.
Textile production shifts rapidly to plant fibers: flax, hemp, cotton (after colonization). This spurs the study of these crops and the development of their cultivation long before the industrial revolution.
Lubricants move to plant oils (linseed, nut, coconut). This accelerates the development of the oil-pressing industry and the chemistry of organic oils.
One can assume that without the need for large-scale livestock farming (which requires large holdings and concentrated resources), small peasant farming naturally survives. This prevents latifundia from forming spontaneously and probably weakens the great landed nobility.
Instead, cooperative structures develop for exchanging farm produce and sharing scarce resources (plows, water mills). This prepares the psychological and organizational ground for an earlier and less violent transition to collective forms of economic life.
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| [+] Ecological sustainability | A preserved biosphere, no livestock methane, no clearing for pasture, slower climate warming |
| [+] An epidemiological shield | No measles, bovine tuberculosis or brucellosis, no avian or swine pandemic influenza strains. Many lives saved in the pre-antibiotic era |
| [+] Crisis-free social evolution | No tragedy of the enclosures, peasant landholding preserved, a non-violent transition to cooperation, biocentric philosophy as the foundation of culture |
| [+] Early development of hydraulic engineering | An extensive system of canals and water transport, early mechanization based on water and wind power |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| [−] Energy failure | Mechanical power per worker falls 10–15 times, 90% of the population is tied to manual hoe work. A likely slowdown of the industrial revolution (the author’s estimate: by 150–200 years)[8] |
| [−] Nutritional pathologies | Deficiency of vitamin B₁₂ (pernicious anemia, nervous system damage) and micronutrients (iron deficiency, rickets) until the 20th century. Lower average height and work capacity |
| [−] Higher famine mortality | Livestock disappears as a buffer against climate shocks. More frequent and deadlier famines in climatically marginal regions[17], [18] |
| [−] Defenseless against smallpox | Jenner’s classic vaccine cannot be created without cowpox. Dependence on dangerous variolation until the 20th century[22] |
In almost every section above, the pros and cons are presented as parallel, independent effects. But modern nutrition science insists they are cascading. Protein deficiency (Section 5) lowers work capacity (Section 3) → which lowers yields → which worsens the nitrogen crisis (Section 2) → which makes famine more likely (Section 6) → and an exhausted population is more vulnerable to the remaining infections (Section 7). These are not five independent drawbacks but one vicious circle with a single point of failure — the absence of animal protein without industrial compensation[10], [15].
The ecological and epidemiological advantages of the scenario are real and supported by modern data on livestock’s carbon footprint and the origins of zoonotic infections. But they are paid for by chronic undernourishment of the population for probably six to eight centuries — until 20th-century agrochemistry and nutrition science offered industrial solutions (synthetic nitrogen, synthetic B₁₂). The optimistic version of the scenario tacitly assumes not “giving up animals” but “giving up animals with 20th-century knowledge already in hand” — and those are two different scenarios.
Renouncing the exploitation of animals from the 14th century would lead to the following results in our hypothetical present (the 22nd–23rd centuries instead of the 21st):
Humanity would reach today’s level of technology (semiconductors, advanced chemistry, aviation, digitalization) not at the start of the 21st century but around the 22nd–23rd centuries. The reason is the low productivity of farm labor without draft animals in the 14th–18th centuries, which did not free up enough hands for a rapid industrial leap[8].
Until the mid-20th century (when in our history industrial production of B₁₂ and synthetic amino acids began), humanity would have been shorter on average and would have suffered from specific neurological and hematological disorders[14]. Once microbial bioreactors appeared, however, the problem would have been fully solved by industrial fermentation. Interestingly, the absence of traditional animal husbandry would have meant earlier development of fermentation biotechnology as a pillar of the pharmaceutical industry.
The history of medicine and pharmacology would be qualitatively different. Had animal experiments been banned in the 14th century, alternative methods of studying life would have advanced faster — in the spirit of the “three Rs” program (replacement, reduction, refinement), which in reality was formulated only in 1959[25]:
Modern cities would be ultra-dense compact poleis along sea coasts, lakes and navigable rivers, connected by extensive canal networks and early electrified railways. Inland cities far from waterways would have remained much less developed until the 19th–20th centuries.
Today’s planet would have:
These benefits, however, would be partly offset by CO₂ emissions from other energy sources (burning wood, later coal) and growing consumption of other resources. Global warming would have come later and been milder — how much depends on the model’s assumptions, and no exact figure can be given here.
Social institutions, law and science would have been shaped from the start by a biocentric ethic of non-violence, which could have weakened:
This would have eased the transition to ecologically closed production cycles and more humane relations between cultures (without an ideology of domination).
“Our present” in this scenario arrives 150–200 years later — not because civilization solved the protein problem differently, but because for eight centuries it bore the costs, until 20th-century agrochemistry and nutrition science closed the gap with the same methods as in our history (ammonia synthesis, synthetic B₁₂, industrial fortification). The scenario describes not so much a sustainable alternative civilization as a demonstration: without a functionally equivalent substitute for animal protein, a total renunciation of animal husbandry in the pre-industrial era is not a utopia but a protracted public-health crisis disguised as ethical progress[15].