Every time Ukraine’s public debate flares up again over delays in Western military aid, a chorus of voices arrives with the same thesis: “It’s our own fault. If we had no corruption, if we had carried out reforms better, if our politicians didn’t make sharp statements — missiles, aircraft and shells would have been flowing uninterrupted long ago.”
The position looks morally attractive because it creates an illusion of control: if only we became “model students of Western democracy,” allied arsenals would open automatically. The problem is that this logic has nothing to do with how world politics actually works.
International relations run on Realpolitik — hard-nosed pragmatism in which the main currency is national interest, the strategic balance of power and deterring the enemy.
To get rid of this “perfect victim” syndrome, it is enough to look at the real record of US foreign policy and American intelligence over the past sixty years. It is a record of Washington arming dictators, radical Islamists, drug traffickers, guerrillas and even sworn enemies — and never once asking them for proof that they were free of corruption.
Iran and the Nicaraguan Contras: selling missiles to an enemy behind Congress’s back
In the mid-1980s President Ronald Reagan’s administration faced two problems. The first was Nicaragua, ruled by a left-wing Sandinista government backed by Cuba and the USSR. The Contra rebels were fighting it, but the US Congress had passed a series of laws (known as the Boland Amendments) that explicitly barred the CIA, the Pentagon and any other government body from spending public money to support the Contras.
The second problem was Iran. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the seizure of American hostages, Tehran was under a strict US arms embargo and officially listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
What the White House did
Staff of the US National Security Council (the key figure was Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North), with the tacit consent of senior leadership, set up a covert scheme. Through Israeli intermediaries the United States began selling Iran — then fighting a grinding war with Iraq — modern American weapons: more than 2,000 BGM-71 TOW anti-tank guided missiles and spare parts for MIM-23 Hawk air-defense systems.
The millions of dollars received from Iran never reached the US Treasury. They sat in secret Swiss bank accounts, from which the money went to buy weapons, ammunition and equipment for the Nicaraguan Contras.
What they turned a blind eye to
- Their own Congress’s explicit legal ban and their own embargo on Iran.
- The nature of the Contras themselves: numerous human-rights reports documented extrajudicial killings and attacks on civilians in Nicaragua, and later a Senate subcommittee chaired by John Kerry found that some Contra groups financed their operations by smuggling cocaine into the United States — and that US agencies preferred not to notice.
- Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (1987)Full text of the official congressional report, Internet Archive (Boston Public Library copy)
- The Iran-Contra Affair 30 Years Later — National Security ArchiveDeclassified documents, George Washington University
- The Oliver North File: Kerry Report, Contras and DrugsThe Kerry Committee report “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy” (1989) and North’s notebooks
The Afghan mujahideen: three billion dollars for radical warlords
When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in late December 1979, Washington saw a chance to give Moscow “its own Vietnam.” The CIA launched Operation Cyclone — one of the largest and most expensive covert operations in the history of American intelligence.
Who supplied what, and how
From 1979 to 1989 the United States spent more than $3 billion arming the Afghan resistance (in 1980s dollars; Saudi Arabia matched it). To preserve “plausible deniability,” the CIA did not hand out weapons directly. It bought Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian rifles, mortars and grenade launchers and passed them to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which then distributed the shipments among Afghan commanders.
In 1986 the Reagan administration took an unprecedented step and began supplying the mujahideen with the latest FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air-defense systems (some 2,000–2,500 launchers and missiles in total). It was the Stingers that cost Soviet aviation its control of the sky.
What they turned a blind eye to
Pakistani intelligence distributed American money and weapons by its own criteria, giving the lion’s share not to moderates but to the most radical Pashtun Islamists. The largest recipient of US aid was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami, known for extreme fanaticism, brutality toward civilians, open hatred of the West and control of a network of heroin labs on the Pakistani border.
There was no audit of where the weapons went: some Stingers ended up in Iran and on black markets almost immediately. After the Soviet withdrawal the CIA spent tens of millions of dollars trying to buy its own missiles back for cash — and a significant share was never found.
- Steve Coll — Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden (2004)2005 Pulitzer Prize, Penguin Press
- George Crile — Charlie Wilson's War (2003)The story of Operation Cyclone, Grove Atlantic
Cambodia: when geopolitics outweighs genocide
In 1975–1979 the ultra-left Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot killed 1.5 to 2 million people in Cambodia — nearly a quarter of the population. In early 1979 the army of Vietnam, the USSR’s main ally in the region, invaded Cambodia, toppled Pol Pot and installed a pro-Vietnamese government.
For Washington and Beijing, a stronger Vietnam — and therefore a stronger USSR — in Southeast Asia was unacceptable.
What the US did
The Carter and Reagan administrations bet on weakening Vietnam through the Cambodian resistance. Officially the United States backed the non-communist factions of the resistance coalition — the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Prince Sihanouk’s movement (ANS) — providing funding, intelligence and non-lethal, and later covert military, aid through Thailand (a program Congress supported in the mid-1980s).
Yet the most capable fighting force of that coalition on the ground remained the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, armed directly by China. For years the US voted at the UN to keep Cambodia’s General Assembly seat with the coalition dominated by Pol Pot’s followers, and American supplies and money sent to coalition partners in the border camps in Thailand inevitably leaked to Pol Pot’s structures as well.
What they turned a blind eye to
- The fact that yesterday’s organizers of the “killing fields” and one of the worst genocides of the 20th century had become situational allies in the Cold War against the USSR and Vietnam.
- Elizabeth Becker — When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge RevolutionPublicAffairs, revised edition
- GAO — Cambodia: U.S. Non-lethal Assistance and Status of the Cambodian Seat at the United Nations (1990)US Government Accountability Office testimony to Congress on aid to the non-communist resistance and the UN seat
- “CIA Covertly Aiding Pro-West Cambodians” — CIA FOIA Reading RoomArchived copy of a 1985 report on covert CIA aid routed through Thailand
The secret war in Laos: an army behind the Geneva Accords
In 1962 in Geneva the great powers, including the United States and the USSR, signed a declaration on the neutrality of Laos that banned foreign troops and covert military missions there. But the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran through Laos, and North Vietnam used it to move troops and weapons for the war against the Americans in South Vietnam.
What the CIA did
To avoid breaching the Geneva Accords with an open invasion, the CIA ran what became known as the “Secret War” in Laos (1961–1975). American instructors built, trained and armed a 30,000-strong guerrilla army drawn from the Hmong hill people under General Vang Pao. Weapons, ammunition and food were flown in by the CIA-controlled airline Air America, and US aircraft dropped more than 2 million tons of bombs on Laos — more than on Germany and Japan combined during the Second World War.
What they turned a blind eye to
- International treaties guaranteeing the country’s neutrality.
- Child soldiers: as Hmong men died in battle in huge numbers, by the late 1960s Vang Pao’s units were recruiting boys of 13–15 en masse, and the CIA kept paying them and issuing them weapons.
- Drug trafficking: the mountains of Laos were part of the Golden Triangle, the world’s center of opium production. For many CIA-allied commanders opium was the main business, and Air America aircraft were repeatedly recorded carrying cargo linked to that trade, because Washington feared losing the loyalty of local chiefs.
- Joshua Kurlantzick — A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA (2017)Simon & Schuster
- Thomas L. Ahern Jr. — Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961–1973The CIA’s internal history (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006), declassified, PDF. Includes the appendix “The Narcotics Question”
- CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room — search “Air America Laos”Declassified CIA documents on Air America and operations in Laos
Congo and Angola: betting on dictators and “blood diamonds”
During the Cold War Africa became an arena of hard competition for resources and influence, where democracy never even made it onto the agenda.
Congo (Zaire)
In the 1960s, during the Congo Crisis, the CIA actively funded and armed anti-communist forces, as well as white mercenaries in eastern Congo, to keep pro-Soviet forces and the Simba rebels from taking power. Its main bet was Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, who seized power in a 1965 coup.
Over the next three decades the United States gave Mobutu’s regime hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid. Meanwhile Mobutu built a textbook system of state plunder — the very word “kleptocracy” entered common use to describe his rule. The dictator’s personal fortune was estimated at $4–5 billion while the country sank into poverty and the army sold off the equipment it received. But Zaire held vast reserves of cobalt, copper and uranium and served as a staging ground for US operations in the region.
Angola
In 1975 civil war broke out in Angola. The CIA launched a program to arm the anti-communist FNLA and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi (a former Maoist who switched to anti-communist rhetoric at the right moment). Even after Congress passed the Clark Amendment in 1976, banning covert operations in Angola, the Reagan administration secured its repeal in 1985 and supplied Savimbi with state-of-the-art weapons, including Stinger and TOW missiles.
Nobody in Washington was deterred by the fact that UNITA mined farmland on a massive scale (leaving Angola with tens of thousands of maimed civilians), forcibly conscripted children and financed the war through illegal mining of “blood diamonds.”
- John Stockwell — In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (1978)Memoir of the former chief of the CIA’s Angola task force, Open Library
- Church Committee Reports (1975–1976) — complete set14 reports of the Senate Church Committee, AARC library
- Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (1975)The section on Congo and Patrice Lumumba — the Church Committee document closest to this episode
The 21st century: the Northern Alliance, Libya and Syria
Some will object: “That was all during the Cold War, in the 20th century. The standards are different now!” But the events of the past twenty years show the algorithm hasn’t changed.
The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (2001)
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States needed to bring down the Taliban regime within weeks without deploying a huge ground army. By late September a team of CIA officers had landed in the Panjshir Valley with suitcases of cash (millions of dollars in bundles of hundred-dollar bills), satellite communications and coordinates for air strikes. Northern Alliance warlords instantly received money, weapons, ammunition and the support of US strategic aviation.
Many of these commanders (such as General Abdul Rashid Dostum) appeared in UN reports as participants in mass war crimes in the 1990s and in drug trafficking. In November 2001, while Taliban prisoners were being transported in sealed metal containers at Dasht-i-Leili, hundreds (by some estimates up to two thousand) of them suffocated. But at that moment these commanders were doing the Pentagon’s main job — driving the Taliban out of Kabul.
Libya (2011)
During the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Barack Obama’s administration and its NATO allies provided an air campaign, intelligence and communications, and sanctioned arms deliveries (mostly via Qatar and the UAE) to a patchwork of rebel groups. Nobody vetted those groups in depth. As a result some of the weapons reached radical Islamists (in September 2012 it was fighters from Ansar al-Sharia who attacked the US mission in Benghazi and killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens), and thousands of man-portable air-defense systems from Gaddafi’s depots spread among militants from Mali to Sinai.
Syria — the Timber Sycamore program (2012–2017)
In 2012–2013 the CIA, together with the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, launched the covert Timber Sycamore program with an annual budget of around $1 billion. Thousands of tons of rifles, machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers were bought up in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and later Syrian rebels began receiving TOW anti-tank systems as well.
The program ran for years even though internal reports by US intelligence itself recorded that a large share of the weapons — through resale, corruption or the defeat of “moderate” units — ended up with jihadists from Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch), and that some were stolen by Jordanian intelligence officers and surfaced on the black market. It was Donald Trump who finally shut the program down in 2017 — not because of corruption, but because he chose to focus solely on defeating ISIS and did not want a conflict with Russia in Syria.
- Gary Schroen — First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan (2005)Memoir of the leader of the first CIA team in Afghanistan, Presidio Press
- The New York Times — “C.I.A. Arms for Syrian Rebels Supplied Black Market, Officials Say” (June 2016)Joint NYT and Al Jazeera investigation into theft of weapons by Jordanian intelligence
- The Washington Post — “Trump ends covert CIA program to arm anti-Assad rebels in Syria, a move sought by Moscow” (July 19, 2017)Greg Jaffe, Adam Entous; summary page at CNAS linking to the original
ATF Operation Fast and Furious: when guns flow to Mexican drug cartels
Even inside the United States, government agencies sometimes run operations that look absurd by ordinary logic.
In 2009–2011 the Phoenix, Arizona field division of the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) ran Operation Fast and Furious. Instead of arresting straw purchasers who were buying batches of military-style guns in American gun shops, ATF agents knowingly let them buy thousands of firearms — semi-automatic AK-47 variants, AR-15 rifles and Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifles — and move them across the border to Mexican drug cartels (above all the Sinaloa cartel).
The idea was to trace the guns up to cartel leadership. In practice the ATF lost track of roughly 2,000 firearms. Those rifles and sniper rifles were used for years in Mexico’s cartel wars, which killed hundreds of civilians and police officers, and in December 2010 a rifle bought under the operation was used in an Arizona firefight that killed US Border Patrol agent Brian Terry.
- DOJ Office of the Inspector General — A Review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters (September 2012)Official report of the US Justice Department’s Inspector General
Three telling bonus cases: when your own laws are put on pause
To close the question of “moral criteria” for good, three more episodes are worth recalling — cases where interest outweighed everything else.
Saddam Hussein and chemical weapons
When revolutionary Iran threatened to defeat Iraq and break through to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982. The United States extended billions in credit to Saddam Hussein’s regime, allowed exports of dual-use technology and — most importantly — passed satellite imagery and Iranian troop positions to Baghdad through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Declassified CIA documents confirm that Washington knew Hussein’s army was using chemical weapons (mustard gas and tabun) against the Iranians, yet it kept sharing intelligence because an Iraqi defeat was seen as the greater evil.
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb in exchange for transit
US law (the Symington and Pressler amendments) strictly prohibited military and economic aid to any country secretly developing nuclear weapons. In the 1980s Pakistan was racing to build its atomic bomb, and US intelligence knew it perfectly well. But Pakistan was the only corridor for moving weapons to the Afghan mujahideen. So every year US presidents signed special waivers, assuring Congress that Pakistan supposedly had no nuclear device, and sold Islamabad the latest F-16 fighters. As soon as Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, by 1990 Washington promptly “remembered” Pakistan’s nuclear program and imposed sanctions.
Operation Paperclip
After Nazi Germany’s defeat, the US government secretly brought more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers and physicians to America. Among them were active Nazi Party members and SS officers, including Wernher von Braun, designer of the V-2 ballistic missile, whose underground factory at the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp cost the lives of around 20,000 prisoners through exhaustion and executions. To get around President Harry Truman’s direct order barring committed Nazis from entry, US military intelligence simply rewrote their personnel files, removing references to SS membership. Their expertise was needed for intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Moon program in the race against the USSR.
In place of a conclusion: what this means for us
None of this is about the US being “bad” or “hypocritical.” Every great power behaves this way when its security and the global balance of power are at stake. The USSR, France, Britain and China played — and still play — by the same rules.
The main lesson for Ukraine is different: we need to separate two realities, once and for all.
We absolutely must destroy corruption, build effective courts, reform the army and protect free speech. But we must do it for ourselves — so that our economy survives, so that a soldier at the front has everything he needs, and so that citizens see a reason to live and work in this country.
When Washington, Berlin or Paris delay missile deliveries, restrict strikes on Russian territory or ration aid by the teaspoon, the reason is not our imperfection. The reason lies in their own fears and calculations: nuclear escalation, an uncontrolled collapse of Russia, the state of their own ammunition stocks, domestic polling ahead of elections.
In great-power politics weapons are not given for a spotless reputation, nor taken away for bad behavior. They are given when the donor clearly sees that the recipient’s victory or resilience solves its own strategic problem. So instead of endless national self-flagellation and attempts to pass an exam in “perfection,” it is far more productive to speak to allies in the one language they have always understood without translation — the language of their own national interests and security.