Why the numbers in the budget don’t add up to the popular slogan — and where Russia’s autumn mobilization comes in.
A thesis is heard more and more often in society and among the military: sooner or later we will have to move to the principle that “everyone will fight.” It is clear where it comes from — a protracted war, lack of rotation, exhaustion at the front. But look at it not emotionally but through the lens of the budget, logistics and the basic arithmetic of governing, and the picture changes: drafting the entire working-age population is not just impossible — it destroys itself faster than it can deliver results.
An army does not exist on its own. It eats what the farm sector grew, runs on fuel someone extracted and refined, and is paid from taxes someone paid. Take a critical mass of people out of the home front and the state instantly loses revenue, breaks its supply chains and eventually has nothing to feed and arm even those it has already mobilized.
To see where the real limit of mobilization lies, start by counting what it costs to maintain one soldier. According to official Defense Ministry data, it is roughly UAH 1.2 million a year — about $30,000. And that is only the baseline: no heavy weapons, vehicles, ammunition or fuel.
* Under the State Rear Operator’s contracts for 2025–2026, a daily ration costs UAH 128 (contracted price) against a ceiling of UAH 171.5 per day — roughly UAH 47,000–63,000 a year.
The biggest item is pay: base salary, rank supplement, length-of-service bonus and, of course, combat allowances of UAH 30,000, 70,000 or 100,000 a month depending on where exactly the soldier is fighting. The rest goes to training centers, transport, medical treatment and insurance.
There is a point that is often missed. All international assistance — grants and concessional loans from the US, the EU and the IMF — may by law go only to civilian and social items: pensions, salaries of teachers and doctors, social payments. That money cannot be spent on the army.
In other words, the entire security and defense sector rests exclusively on domestic revenue — taxes, customs duties and domestic government bonds. In the first half of the year it took UAH 1.4 trillion, or 63% of all general-fund spending, and in June alone the army “ate” UAH 263.5 billion. The military levy on its own brings in more than UAH 163.6 billion a year.
Now consider how much of this a single employee pays: 18% personal income tax plus 5% military levy plus 22% unified social contribution. For sole proprietors it is simpler but still adds up — from 10% of the minimum wage (UAH 864.7/month) to 1–5% of income or turnover. Every person removed from this chain is a hole in the revenue side of the budget at exactly the moment money is needed most.
Since the army is financed solely by domestic taxes, the Cabinet and the President’s Office cite the same ratio: keeping one soldier at the front takes 6 to 8 people on the home front working officially and paying taxes.
“We must understand: one warrior means 6 people in civilian life paying taxes” — from public statements on the “math” of mobilization.
Direct maintenance cost: an extra UAH 600 billion, all from domestic sources.
Home-front support required: to feed and equip 500,000 new conscripts, the civilian sector would need another 3–4 million official taxpayers. Where they would come from is a rhetorical question.
And here an unpleasant nuance emerges — call it the “double hit.” It is not the unemployed who are drafted but precisely those who work. Take one average taxpayer off the payroll and the budget immediately loses his monthly income tax, social contribution, military levy and even the VAT he generated by shopping. In return it takes on an obligation to pay that same person UAH 100,000 a month. The result is not “plus one soldier” but “minus one taxpayer and plus one spending item” at the same time.
The government understands this, of course, which is why it is developing economic deferment tools — legal-salary criteria or a fixed military levy (for example, UAH 20,000 a month per employee). The idea is simple: let businesses keep key people, and give the budget another UAH 68–307 billion a year directly for the Armed Forces without hurting production.
The labor market is already cracking. 78% of Ukrainian businesses now report an acute staff shortage — a year ago it was 60%. 69% of employers name mobilization as the main reason, and 61% name emigration.
The problem is not the numbers as such but who exactly is being taken. Not everyone can be replaced by someone off the street — and this is where it hurts most:
When someone says “put the economy on a war footing,” they usually just mean “produce more weapons.” In public-administration theory and 20th-century practice, though, it means something far more radical: abolishing the market economy, severely restricting people’s rights and completely restructuring how society works. Here is what it actually consists of:
Such a scenario is possible only in a state with absolute internal control — in essence, a dictatorship. In an open market economy, an attempt to introduce anything similar ends predictably: business goes into the shadows, investment stops and governability collapses.
History is fairly unambiguous here: every time a state ignored these limits and pushed mobilization beyond what the home front could bear, it ended in exhaustion and defeat — whatever the era.
The classic case of total centralization. The mobilization plan of June 30, 1941 switched the country to directive management; ration cards were introduced in July and lasted until December 1947: workers at defense plants got 800 g of bread a day, everyone else 400 g. The working day was 8 hours plus a mandatory 3 hours of overtime, and leaving a factory without permission was punished with 5–8 years in prison as desertion. Even under that pressure the USSR held out — but only thanks to a totalitarian apparatus of coercion, enormous raw-material reserves and Lend-Lease from the Allies. Without those three factors the model simply does not work.
The Blitzkrieg failed, the naval blockade began — and in 1916 the Hindenburg Program was adopted, with compulsory labor for men aged 16–60. Drafting farm workers collapsed agricultural output and famine followed — the “turnip winter” of 1916/1917, when rations covered no more than half of calorie needs. The army, meanwhile, held the front. But it was the home front, not the front line, that broke first — and that, not defeat on the battlefield, led to revolution and capitulation in 1918.
Here the sheer scale of destruction is telling. Foreign trade turnover fell from $29 billion in 2010 to $4 billion in 2023, and exports shrank to $650 million. Unemployment reached 57%, the pound lost 270 times its value, and inflation topped 141%. Total economic losses exceeded $260 billion.
And here is an example of a developed economy stopping in time. After the escalation in October 2023 Israel called up more than 300,000 reservists — and within a few months began demobilizing them in stages because the losses proved too large. One reservist cost about 48,000 shekels (~$13,000) a month, direct costs reached 5 billion shekels ($1.3 billion) a month, and losses from people not going to work added another 1.6 billion shekels ($427 million). To avoid sliding into recession, Israel reduced the call-up and bet on protecting high tech — the sector that provides more than half of the country’s exports.
In July 2026 Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said plainly: the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize at least 500,000 people this autumn. Some will be thrown into battle within two weeks to plug holes in the east; the rest will train for a month, apparently for a new axis of the front. Which raises the question: if Russia keeps building up such waves, should Ukraine respond in kind — with its own mobilization in response? This is exactly where the same arithmetic should be applied, only to the enemy.
Under Russian law, mobilized soldiers cannot be paid less than contract soldiers in equivalent posts — and those sums have long since stopped being symbolic. The one-off signing bonus alone consists of a federal 400,000 rubles plus a regional part averaging about 2.1 million rubles nationwide and reaching 3.4–4.5 million in St Petersburg or Krasnodar Krai. In total that is roughly 2.5 million rubles per person — before the first paycheck.
500,000 × ~2.5 million rubles comes to 1.2–1.3 trillion rubles in signing payments alone, without monthly pay, equipment or combat allowances. For comparison, that is almost a tenth of Russia’s entire annual defense budget (12.93 trillion rubles for 2026).
And it lands on a budget that is already bursting at the seams. By the end of June 2026 Russia’s cumulative federal budget deficit had reached 5.7 trillion rubles — 2.5% of GDP, well above the 1.6% planned for the whole year. The liquid part of the National Wealth Fund, which the Kremlin uses to patch holes, shrank in the first months of 2026 from about 4.2 trillion rubles (~$55 billion) to 3.6 trillion. Defense spending was supposed to be cut by about 11% this year — but at the current pace of escalation that looks less and less realistic.
Interestingly, even the Bank of Russia effectively acknowledges the same problem in its own materials: limited labor plus state demand (including defense demand) produces not output growth but inflation, because wages grow faster than productivity. In essence, the same “double hit” we examined for Ukraine in Part 02 works in Russia too. Just with a longer runway.
Russia’s population is about four times Ukraine’s (146 million vs 38 million); it has access to migrant workers from Central Asia, it has prisoners, and above all it has an authoritarian apparatus of coercion able to crush any labor or social discontent. That is precisely the “war footing” toolkit from Part 04. So the Kremlin can push its macroeconomic mobilization limit much further than an open market economy could afford. But the limit does not disappear; it is simply further away. A depleted labor market, a shrinking National Wealth Fund, persistent inflation and the risk of new sanctions do their work — just more slowly than in Ukraine.
If total mobilization harms Ukraine’s economy even for the sake of its own front-line needs, it makes even less sense as a “number for number” response to a wave Russia can sustain longer. In a race of human resources the enemy has a structural advantage — and there is no point trying to win it. It is more rational to act on a different plane:
An autumn wave of 500,000 — and probably more to follow — is no reason to repeat the very mistake this whole article warns against. Time and macroeconomics are more likely on the side of whoever protects the productive base of the home front: Russia’s budget deficit, depleted labor market and shrinking National Wealth Fund mean the Kremlin’s numerical advantage also has a ceiling — just further away than Ukraine’s. The task is not to chase that ceiling with our own mobilization, but to make reaching it as costly and as fast as possible for Russia.
To boil it down to one idea: “everyone will fight” is a good line for a rally, but it doesn’t survive contact with the budget. International assistance legally cannot finance the army, so the Armed Forces live exclusively on taxes from civilian businesses and working people. Removing the entire workforce from the economy means removing the very source that feeds that army.
An attempt to take the entire working-age population out of the economy will end in collapsing tax revenue, paralyzed critical infrastructure and a state that simply cannot feed, clothe and pay those it has already mobilized. Resilience in a war of attrition is not about how many people can be put under arms, but about whether a balance can be kept between the needs of the front and what the home front can produce.
| The idea that “everyone will fight” | What actually happens |
|---|---|
| The front gets unlimited reinforcements | ✕ The budget loses its tax base faster than it can arm new soldiers |
| The state controls the labor force | ✕ Critical industries (energy, agriculture, logistics) collapse |
| The home front can bear any load | ✕ History (USSR, Germany, Syria) shows the opposite without a totalitarian apparatus of coercion |
| Mobilization is a purely military decision | ✓ It is above all a budget equation: 1 soldier = 6–8 taxpayers on the home front |