Analysis · Missile defense systems · 2025

Ballistic missile defense: technology, strategy and the task for Ukraine

A complete technical overview of missile defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. Comparative characteristics, employment strategies and practical conclusions on Ukraine’s priorities.

Author: vadim.li · Contact: vadim.li@gmail.com · Technical analysis BMD Strategy

01 / Systems that can shoot down ballistic missiles

A ballistic missile is a fundamentally different target from a cruise missile or a drone. It climbs into the upper atmosphere or even near space and then falls on its target almost vertically at 2,000 to 7,000 m/s. No air-defense system designed against aerodynamic targets is built for these conditions — not in radar elevation coverage, not in interceptor speed, not in how it destroys the warhead.

Only a limited number of systems in the world can do this job reliably. They share a few features: a specialized radar able to track vertically, a fast interceptor, and either a kinetic hit (hit-to-kill) or an extremely precise directional warhead.

Why NASAMS, IRIS-T, Buk and S-300 don’t intercept ballistic missiles

This is not about the quality of these systems — they do their own jobs very well. The problem is that they were designed against aerodynamic targets: aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and drones. Ballistic missiles pose three challenges they cannot solve.

1

Speed

In the terminal phase a ballistic missile reaches 2,000–7,000 m/s. IRIS-T or Buk interceptors fly several times slower. Even on a head-on course the interceptor cannot reach the intercept point in time.

2

Angle of descent

Conventional air-defense radars scan the horizon and the lower hemisphere. A ballistic missile falls almost vertically. Re-pointing the antenna takes 1–2 seconds, during which the target drops several more kilometers.

3

Kill mechanism

A conventional surface-to-air missile detonates near the target and hits it with fragments. A massive ballistic warhead with thick thermal protection can survive that and keep falling by inertia. Guaranteed destruction requires either a direct kinetic hit or a very powerful directional blast at point-blank range.

Systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles: comparison table

System Country Kill mechanism Range (ballistic) Intercept altitude Missile speed Status
Patriot PAC-3 MSE USA Hit-to-kill (kinetic) up to 60 km up to 36 km ~Mach 5 ✓ Combat-proven
SAMP/T Aster 30 B1 France / Italy Directional blast-fragmentation warhead 30–35 km up to 25 km ~Mach 4.5 ✓ Operational
THAAD USA Hit-to-kill (exo-atmospheric) up to 200 km 40–150 km ~Mach 8.2 ✓ Deployed in Korea, UAE
Arrow 2 (Hetz-2) Israel / USA Hit-to-kill + directional warhead 90 km up to 50 km ~Mach 9 ✓ Combat-proven (Iran 2024)
Arrow 3 (Hetz-3) Israel / USA Hit-to-kill (exo-atmospheric) ~2,400 km 100 km+ >Mach 10 ✓ Intercepts in space
Aegis SM-3 Block IIA USA / Japan Hit-to-kill (exo-atmospheric, sea-based) 2,500 km 1,500 km ~Mach 15 ✓ US Navy and Japanese ships
Cheongung-II (KM-SAM) South Korea Hit-to-Kill 40 km up to 20 km ~Mach 4 ✓ Domestic design, in service
L-SAM South Korea Hit-to-kill (high altitude) ~150 km up to 60 km ~Mach 6 △ Testing, 2024–25
HQ-19 China Hit-to-kill (THAAD analog) ~250 km up to 150 km ~Mach 9 △ Limited public data
S-300V4 Russia Blast-fragmentation (no hit-to-kill) up to 40 km up to 35 km ~Mach 3 △ Limited effectiveness
S-500 Prometey Russia Hit-to-kill (claimed) 600 km (claimed) up to 200 km (claimed) N/A ✗ Few units, unverified
A-235 Nudol Russia Hit-to-kill (ASAT/BMD) ~1,500 km up to 800 km N/A △ Strategic, Moscow only
Freyja / FP-7.X Ukraine + EU Hit-to-kill (in design) TBD TBD TBD △ Project, 2024–2026

Classification by intercept altitude

Layer Altitude Systems Features
Lower (terminal) 0–40 km Patriot PAC-3 MSE, SAMP/T, Cheongung-II, S-300V4 The last line of interception. Limited reaction time. Point defense of cities and facilities.
Middle 40–150 km THAAD, Arrow 2, L-SAM Interception in the ascent or midcourse phase. Larger coverage area.
Exo-atmospheric (space) 150 km+ Arrow 3, Aegis SM-3 B.IIA, A-235 Interception in near space. The largest coverage area, but the smallest arsenal in the world.
Section takeaway. Effective ballistic missile defense requires at least two layers. Patriot PAC-3 or SAMP/T alone is terminal defense of a single point. Covering a large area or several sites at once requires a combination of lower- and middle-layer systems.

02 / Patriot PAC-3 vs SAMP/T: a detailed comparison

Both systems form the backbone of NATO’s modern ground-based ballistic missile defense. But behind similar effectiveness figures lie two different engineering philosophies — American pragmatism of maximum firepower versus a European approach of flexibility and integration.

Intercept method

Patriot PAC-3 MSE — Hit-to-Kill

The interceptor physically rams the enemy warhead. The kinetic energy of a collision at ~Mach 5 is so great that the enemy missile disintegrates in the air without the interceptor detonating.

Advantage: guaranteed destruction of the airframe and warhead. The warhead does not “survive” and keep falling by inertia.

Drawback: requires extremely precise guidance — an error of more than a few meters means a miss.

SAMP/T Aster 30 — directional warhead

The missile gets as close to the target as possible and detonates a directional blast-fragmentation warhead. Aster 30 can also score a direct hit, but the main design intent is a detonation at very close range.

Advantage: greater tolerance for guidance error than PAC-3. A reliable result once the target is inside the effective kill zone.

Drawback: there is a theoretical risk that fragments of a heavy warhead keep falling. In practice it is minimal with a correct detonation.

Radar: sector vs all-round coverage

Patriot AN/MPQ-65

A sector radar with a ~120° field of view. It faces one direction — where the threat is expected. Re-pointing takes 1–2 seconds.

Advantage: all transmitter power is concentrated on one sector — longer detection range and more accurate tracking.

Drawback: vulnerable to attacks from the flanks and rear. When the threat direction changes suddenly, critical time is lost.

SAMP/T Kronos / Arabel

The radar rotates continuously, providing 360° coverage. It can track up to 100 targets simultaneously in any sector.

Advantage: no “dead zones.” The system responds to a threat from any direction without a re-pointing delay.

Drawback: power is spread across the whole sphere — somewhat shorter range in any given sector than Patriot.

Launch vector

Patriot — inclined launch

Launch canisters are raised at an angle toward the expected threat. The missile flies straight to the likely intercept sector.

Advantage: less time in the initial flight phase before reaching the intercept zone.

Drawback: the launcher must be pre-oriented. If the threat comes from an unexpected direction, effectiveness drops.

SAMP/T — vertical launch

The Aster missile is fired straight up and then turns toward the target using thrust-vector control. This allows an immediate attack in any direction.

Advantage: complete independence from launcher orientation. Ideal for unpredictable threats.

Drawback: a few seconds are spent on the turn after launch.

Technical comparison

Parameter Patriot PAC-3 MSE SAMP/T Aster 30 Block 1NT Edge
Range (ballistic) up to 60 km 30–35 km Patriot
Intercept altitude up to 36 km up to 25 km Patriot
Kill mechanism Hit-to-Kill Directional warhead (+ hit-to-kill) Patriot (more reliable)
Radar coverage 120° (sector) 360° (all-round) SAMP/T
Launch vector Inclined Vertical SAMP/T (more flexible)
Deployment time 15–20 min 10–15 min SAMP/T
Missiles per launcher up to 16 up to 8 Patriot
Mobility Medium (wheeled) Higher (more compact) SAMP/T
Datalink standard JTIDS / Link-16 Link-16 (native) Even
Missile cost ~$4–5 m ~€2–3 m SAMP/T
Production capacity Limited (allied waiting list) MBDA is expanding Even
Combat experience Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ukraine (2023–25) Limited (Iran, Yemen — indirectly) Patriot

Bottom line

Patriot is better at

Range and intercept altitude. More missiles at the site. Proven hit-to-kill. Extensive combat experience.

SAMP/T is better at

All-round coverage with no dead zones. Faster deployment. Cheaper missiles. Vertical launch — instant response from any direction.

Best solution

A combination of both. SAMP/T for all-round detection and rapid response. Patriot for the most reliable kill of a confirmed ballistic target.

03 / Strategy: how to close the sky to ballistic missiles

“Closing the sky” over an entire country against ballistic missiles is technologically and economically impossible. No country in the world has a seamless ballistic missile shield. A realistic strategy rests on four levels, each solving a separate problem.

Level 1 — Point (site) defense

Missile defense assets (Patriot, SAMP/T, THAAD) are concentrated around critical sites: large cities, command posts, nuclear power plants, key energy and defense-industry facilities. These are protective “domes” with a radius of 30 to 60 km, inside which the system can intercept ballistic missiles. The rest of the territory stays exposed.

Protection priority Rationale Minimum assets
City of 1 million+ Civilian casualties, morale pressure, economic center 2–3 Patriot / SAMP/T batteries
Nuclear power plant A nuclear accident would make defending a large region impossible 2 batteries + backup radar
Armed Forces command post Its destruction would paralyze command of the defense 2–4 batteries
Key airport / logistics hub Critical for arms deliveries and medical evacuation 1–2 batteries
Defense plant Its destruction limits domestic production of drones and missiles 1–2 batteries

Level 2 — Destroying launchers (the “hunting” strategy)

The most effective “anti-ballistic weapon” is the one that destroys the missile before launch. This strategy requires building a complete reconnaissance-and-strike chain.

1

Satellite and signals intelligence

Systems such as SBIRS detect the heat signature of a launch instantly. Electronic intelligence tracks activation of radars and communications associated with launch batteries.

2

Deep-reconnaissance drones

UAVs such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk or Bayraktar Akıncı with synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) can detect mobile launchers on the move and in hides deep behind enemy lines at ranges up to 300 km.

3

Strikes on launchers, depots and the defense industry

ATACMS (300 km), Storm Shadow / SCALP (500+ km), domestic FPV drones and Shahed-class kamikaze drones used in reverse attack launchers, stores of liquid oxygen and solid propellant, and production facilities.

4

Destroying defense-industry plants

Every destroyed plant means months without missiles at the front. Strikes on producers of rocket motors, guidance systems and fuel-system components have a strategic multiplier effect.

Level 3 — Domestic ballistic missiles and an asymmetric response

If the enemy knows that a strike on a major city will certainly bring a retaliatory strike on a comparable target in its own country, it factors that risk into its decisions. This is the concept of a “balance of fear” for non-nuclear states.

An important limit. For a country seeking Euro-Atlantic integration, developing or acquiring nuclear weapons would mean immediate and catastrophic sanctions, loss of allied support and exclusion from collective-security structures. It is not an option. Developing domestic operational-tactical and tactical missiles with conventional warheads, by contrast, is a fully legitimate path that most developed countries follow.

Level 4 — Distributed infrastructure

If critical infrastructure is dispersed, a single ballistic missile cannot deliver a systemic blow. Instead of one large thermal plant — dozens of gas-engine or solar stations. Instead of a centralized command post — a distributed network of smaller nodes. This lowers the value of each individual missile strike for the enemy.

What exactly Ukraine needs to do

Recommendations for Ukraine’s ballistic missile defense strategy

04 / Early warning systems: space and ground

Ballistic missile defense without early warning is an army with its hands tied. On its own, Patriot reacts to a target within its range — leaving about 30–90 seconds to intercept. An early warning system adds another 5–15 minutes — time to evacuate, bring systems to combat readiness and position them optimally for interception.

Layer 1 — Space (detecting the launch)

Ignition of a rocket motor produces a heat plume of 2,000–3,000 °C. For the infrared sensors of a satellite in geostationary orbit this is like a bright flash against a dark background — detection comes 20–90 seconds after launch.

System Country Orbit Detection time Coverage Status
SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System) USA GEO + HEO <60 sec Global ✓ Operational, 6 satellites
Next-Gen OPIR USA GEO <30 sec Global △ SBIRS replacement, 2024+
TWISTER / ODIN'S EYE EU HEO / MEO 60–120 sec Eurasia + Middle East △ In development, 2025–2030
DSP (Defense Support Program) USA GEO 60–90 sec Global △ Partly decommissioned, backup
EKS Tundra (14F142) Russia HEO 60–90 sec USA and Eurasia △ 4 satellites, limited reliability
Yaogan + SBIRS analog China GEO + LEO ~60 sec Asia + Pacific △ Developing, details classified

Layer 2 — Ground (tracking and target classification)

Once a satellite has detected a launch and passed on preliminary coordinates, ground radars take over continuous tracking. They compute the exact ballistic trajectory, determine the impact point and pass targeting data to Patriot or SAMP/T batteries.

System Country Type Range Capabilities
PAVE PAWS (AN/FPS-115) USA Fixed phased array, 240° 5,500 km Tracking ICBMs and space objects, hundreds of targets at once
COBRA DANE (AN/FPS-108) USA (Alaska) Fixed phased array, 120° 2,000 km Tracking launches from Asia and the Pacific
SBX-1 (Sea-Based X-Band) USA Mobile, sea-based 2,000 km Ultra-precise discrimination — telling warheads from decoys
TPY-2 (THAAD Radar) USA Mobile phased array, X-band 1,000 km Deployed with THAAD, precision tracking
Thales SMART-L MM/N Netherlands / NATO Shipborne, S-band 2,000 km Early warning, passing targeting data to allies
Nostradamus France Over-the-horizon (OTH) 3,000 km Ionospheric reflection. Low accuracy (~200 km), but early detection
Saab Giraffe AMB Sweden / NATO Mobile, 3D, C/S-band 400 km Tactical level. Feeds data into the NATO system
J/FPS-5 (“Gamera”) Japan Fixed phased array 1,500 km Tracking Korean and Chinese launches
Voronezh-DM / Konteyner Russia Fixed phased arrays and OTH 4,000–6,000 km Strategic warning. Data not shared with allies.

How a real warhead is told apart from decoys

Knowing about intercept systems, the enemy uses countermeasures: along with the warhead it releases light metallized balloons, chaff or inflatable dummies. In the vacuum of space they fly alongside the warhead and overload radars. But nature itself provides a filter:

Trajectory phase Discrimination method Reliability
Space (100+ km) Micro-Doppler analysis: a warhead spins and produces a characteristic “jittering” signal; a light balloon does not. Also infrared signature analysis: thermal-protection material reflects differently. 70–85%
Upper atmosphere (50–100 km) Aerodynamic braking: light decoys slow down sharply due to air resistance and burn up. The heavy warhead keeps going — the speed difference becomes obvious within seconds. 90–95%
Dense atmosphere (<50 km) Practically all decoys are already gone. The Patriot / SAMP/T radar tracks the single target that keeps moving. The filtering problem is solved naturally. 98–99%
Key takeaway. The atmosphere is the best and cheapest “sorter” between warheads and decoys. That is why terminal-layer systems (Patriot, SAMP/T) are so effective in practice: by the time they start tracking, nature has already removed 95% of the false targets. The decoy problem matters only for systems that intercept in space (Arrow 3, SM-3).

05 / Radars and missile defense: Europe, Asia, Russia

European systems

System / Country Type Range Role in the NATO system Status
SMART-L MM/N (Netherlands) Shipborne, S-band, 360° 2,000 km Early warning. Passes targeting data into the NATO network via Link-16. Deployed in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic. ✓ Operational
Nostradamus (France) Over-the-horizon (OTH), HF band 3,000 km Detects launches deep in enemy territory by ionospheric reflection. Low accuracy (~200 km) — warning only, not targeting. ✓ Operational
Giraffe AMB (Sweden / NATO) Mobile 3D phased array, C/S-band 400 km Tactical detection and data transfer into the NATO system. Deployed in the Baltic states and Poland. ✓ Operational
TWISTER / ODIN'S EYE (EU) Infrared satellite constellation (14 spacecraft) Global A space warning layer independent of the US. The goal is to duplicate SBIRS for the European Union. △ In development 2025–2030
HENSOLDT TwInvis (Germany) Passive radar (no emitter of its own) 250 km Detects low-observable targets. Creates no EM field of its own — invisible to enemy electronic warfare. △ In testing

Asian missile defense systems

Country / System Components Ballistic interception Features
Japan — JADGE / Aegis Aegis BMD (DDG ships), Patriot PAC-3, J/FPS-5 (“Gamera”) and J/FPS-7 radars Two-tier: SM-3 in space + PAC-3 in the terminal phase The most advanced missile defense in Asia after the US. Four Aegis destroyers are permanently on duty. Interception of North Korean missiles has been rehearsed.
South Korea — KAMD Cheongung-II (KM-SAM), L-SAM (in testing), Aegis SM-2/3, PAC-3 (imported) Lower and middle layers. L-SAM — up to 60 km altitude. Active development of a domestic component base. L-SAM is a domestically designed hit-to-kill interceptor. The goal is full independence from imports by 2030.
China — IADS HQ-9B/C (S-300 analog), HQ-19 (THAAD analog), domestic satellites, over-the-horizon radars HQ-19 — exo-atmospheric. HQ-9C — terminal. The largest missile defense arsenal in Asia. All components domestically designed. Specifications classified. HQ-19 completed its first flight tests in 2023–24.
Israel — multi-layered missile defense Iron Dome (rockets/mortars), David's Sling (cruise/short-range ballistic), Arrow 2 (ballistic), Arrow 3 (exo-atmospheric) Four layers. Arrow 3 intercepts in space. The first country with a confirmed combat exo-atmospheric interception (Arrow 3, November 2023); used it on a large scale during Iran’s attack in April 2024. The most combat-experienced missile defense in the world.

Russian missile defense systems

Russia traditionally presents its systems as “the best in the world.” The real picture is far more modest, especially given the lack of combat experience intercepting ballistic missiles and of documented effectiveness data.

System Purpose Effectiveness against ballistic missiles Limitations
S-400 Triumf The main air-defense system. Designed mainly against aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles. △ Limited. No hit-to-kill. The 48N6 missile is not designed for very fast ballistic targets. No kinetic interceptor. The long-range 40N6E missile is unverified against ballistic targets. Combat experience in Ukraine — numerous losses to ATACMS and Storm Shadow.
S-300V4 The army variant, built specifically for missile defense. Heavy very fast missiles on a tracked chassis (Gladiator 9M83, Giant 9M82). △ Better than S-400, but still no confirmed hit-to-kill. Outdated components. Small-batch system. Not integrated into modern network-centric architectures.
S-500 Prometey Presented as a next-generation missile and space defense system. Claimed range 600 km, targets: ballistic missiles and hypersonic vehicles. ✗ Unverified. Only isolated prototypes are known. Open-source data is highly contradictory. Sanctions have limited access to microelectronics. Series production unknown. Not a single confirmed interception.
A-135 Amur / A-235 Nudol A strategic system defending Moscow against a massive nuclear strike. Combines nuclear-tipped interceptors (53T6) and kinetic ones (14Ts033 for A-235). ✓ Designed exactly for this, but only to defend Moscow. Geographically tied to the Moscow region. About 68 interceptors. Not suitable for mobile deployment.
Overall verdict on Russia. Russia’s missile defense is a mix of outdated platforms (S-300V4, A-135), systems never designed for ballistic targets (S-400) and claimed but unverified developments (S-500). The only truly specialized system (A-235) protects Moscow but is not mobile. The Ukrainian armed forces’ experience destroying S-300s and S-400s has shown their vulnerability to ATACMS strikes from 250–300 km.

06 / The Freyja project, the FP-7.X missile and the Link-16 standard

The Freyja project is an attempt by Europe and Ukraine to solve a key problem: Patriot is expensive, the delivery queue is long, and ballistic missile defense is needed now. The goal is an intercept system cheaper than Patriot but integrated into NATO architecture, which can be produced on European capacity.

Key parameters of the Freyja project

<€1M
Target missile cost
Versus $4–5 m for PAC-3 MSE. The savings allow an arsenal twice as large.
13
Partner companies
Including Kongsberg (Norway), Diehl Defence (Germany), Fire Point (Ukraine).
Link-16
Data-exchange standard
Native integration into the NATO network from day one. No adapters needed.
FP-7.X
Interceptor missile
A Ukrainian design by Fire Point. Very high speed. Detailed specifications are not published.

Freyja compared with Patriot and SAMP/T

Parameter Patriot PAC-3 MSE SAMP/T Aster 30 Freyja / FP-7.X
Missile cost $4–5 m €2–3 m <€1 m (target)
Kill mechanism Hit-to-Kill Directional warhead Hit-to-kill (in design)
Manufacturer Lockheed Martin (USA) MBDA (France / Italy) EU consortium + Fire Point (Ukraine)
Dependence on the US Full (licenses, components, ITAR) Partial None
Link-16 (native) Partial support Yes Yes, from day one
Radar AN/MPQ-65 (sector) Kronos / Arabel (360°) Modular (partner’s choice)
Readiness Operational, in service Operational, in service Project, 2024–2026

The Link-16 standard: why it is critical

Link-16 is a secure standard for digital exchange of tactical data among all NATO elements: aircraft, ships, ground-based missile defense, command posts. It is not just “military Wi-Fi” — it is an architecture that lets different systems from different countries act as a single organism.

Link-16 function What it means in practice
TDMA (time division) Each participant gets its own micro-slot in a millisecond cycle. Up to 128 participants in one network without mutual interference.
FHSS (frequency hopping) The signal changes frequency up to 77,000 times per second. Enemy electronic warfare cannot jam such a transmission.
Engage on Remote (EoR) A Polish or Romanian radar detects the target and sends a J-message with coordinates. A Ukrainian Patriot battery intercepts the target without switching on its own radar. Its position stays invisible to enemy electronic warfare.
Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) All network participants see the same air picture in real time. This rules out double targeting and friendly fire.
Network-centric fire One sensor (radar) can provide targeting to several shooters (Patriot + SAMP/T) at once, optimizing the use of missiles.

Link-16 and Freyja — what they mean for Ukraine


— Overall conclusions

Ballistic missile defense is not one system or one solution. It is an architecture of several interconnected layers: warning, detection, interception and asymmetric strikes on the enemy’s production base.

Conclusion What it means in practice
Full sky coverage does not exist Any missile defense strategy is a choice of priorities. Cities and critical infrastructure come first. Rear areas are deliberately left exposed.
Patriot and SAMP/T complement each other Patriot: greater range and altitude, guaranteed hit-to-kill. SAMP/T: all-round coverage, faster deployment, cheaper munitions. The optimum is both systems at one site.
The kill chain beats interception A destroyed rocket-motor plant deprives the enemy of dozens of launches. That costs many times less than intercepting the same missiles in flight.
The atmosphere filters decoys automatically Terminal-layer systems (Patriot, SAMP/T) intercept targets already filtered by the atmosphere. The decoy problem concerns only the space layer (Arrow 3, SM-3).
Link-16 is a prerequisite for effectiveness An isolated Patriot battery is only point defense. A Patriot on the Link-16 network is a node in a system that sees the entire theater of operations.
Freyja is a strategic bet, not an immediate solution The first series Freyja systems are expected no earlier than 2027–2028. Existing systems are what is needed now. But building domestic missile defense capability is essential for long-term security.

Sources and references

  1. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense — mda.mil — official specifications for THAAD, Patriot, SM-3, SBIRS.
  2. MBDA Group — mbda-systems.com — Aster 30, SAMP/T characteristics, the TWISTER project.
  3. Lockheed Martin — lockheedmartin.com — PAC-3 MSE specification and combat record.
  4. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) — “The Military Balance 2024” — quantitative data on missile defense systems by country.
  5. Jane's by S&P Global — technical reference works on missile defense systems (subscription access).
  6. Israeli Ministry of Defense / Rafael Advanced Defense Systems — Arrow 2/3, David's Sling. Reports on interception of Iranian missiles, April 2024.
  7. Korean Agency for Defense Development (ADD) — Cheongung-II, L-SAM — official press releases 2023–24.
  8. NATO — Allied Command Transformation — documents on Link-16, JTIDS and network-centric defense architecture.
  9. Congressional Research Service (CRS) — «Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview» (RL30024).
  10. Arms Control Association — analysis of missile defense treaties and modern systems.
  11. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) — data on transfers of missile defense systems by country.
  12. Fire Point / Freyja Project — official press releases and materials from DSEI 2023, Eurosatory 2024.
VL
vadim.li — independent analyst and content producer
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